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Summary
The distinction between ‘mechanical’ and ‘teleological’ has been familiar
since Kant; between a fully mechanistic, quantitative science of Nature and
a teleological, qualitative approach to living beings, namely ‘organisms’
 understood as purposive or at least functional entities. The beauty of this
 distinction is that it apparently makes intuitive sense and maps onto histo -
rico-conceptual constellations in the life sciences, regarding the status of 
the body versus that of the machine. I argue that the mechanism-teleology
distinction is imprecise and flawed using examples including the ‘functional’
features present even in Cartesian physiology, the Oxford Physiologists’ work
on circulation and respiration, the fact that the model of the ‘body-machine’
is not a mechanistic reduction of organismic properties to basic physical
 properties but is focused on the uniqueness of organic life; and the concept
of ‘animal economy’ in vitalist medicine, which I present as a ‘teleomechanis-
tic’ concept of organism (borrowing a term of Lenoir’s which he applied to
nineteenth-century embryology) – neither mechanical nor teleological.
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The problem of early modern teleomechanism
We have been accustomed at least since Kant and the ensuing consensus in
the history of philosophy to distinguish between the ‘mechanical’ and the
‘teleological’; between a fully mechanistic, quantitative science of Nature
 exemplified by Newton (or Galileo, or Descartes) and a teleological, quali-
tative approach to living beings ultimately expressed in the concept of
 ‘organism’ – a purposive entity, or at least an entity possessed of inherent
functional properties. The beauty of this distinction is that it seems to make
intuitive sense and to map onto historical and conceptual constellations 
in medicine, physiology and the related natural-philosophical discussions on
the status of the body versus that of the machine. From von Wright to Nagel
(with Polanyi as a mirror image, presenting as negative what others present
as positive) mechanistic versus teleological explanations are always pre-
sented as crucial, including as regards the scientific understanding of life.1
I argue that the distinction between mechanism and teleology is imprecise
and flawed, on the basis of a series of cumulative examples: (i) the presence
of ‘functional’ or ‘purposive’ features even in Cartesian physiology; (ii) 
the usage both therein and in the ‘Oxford physiologists’ of notions such as
the ‘office’ (officium) of particular organs; (iii) the fact that the model of 
the ‘body-machine’, as in La Mettrie, is not at all a mechanistic reduction of
organismic properties to basic physical properties but on the contrary a way
of emphasizing the uniqueness of organic life; and (iv) the concept of ‘animal
economy’ in vitalist medical theory, which I present as a ‘teleo-mechanistic’
concept of organism (borrowing a term of Timothy Lenoir’s which he used
to discuss nineteenth-century embryology) – neither mechanical nor teleo-
logical.
Again, the distinction between teleological models and explanations, 
and mechanistic models and explanations of living beings is familiar and
 apparently historically robust. But scholars have often maintained that the
distinction is of little use in making sense of historical texts – and yet, early
modern natural philosophy is consistently presented as the heyday of mech-
anism (even if some writers have moved away from a monolithic, somewhat
ahistorical conception of mechanism towards a more pluralistic conception).2
Contrary to this narrative of triumphant mechanical purism, scholars such 
as Gaukroger, Osler, and Lennox have noted either the irreducibility of
 teleological analyses in representative early modern natural philosophers
1 Wright 1971, 2; Polanyi 1969, 157.
2 Contrast Dijksterhuis 1963 with, e.g., Gabbey 1993, Des Chene 2005 and Keller 2010.
(e.g. Boyle, Gassendi) or a more discreet presence of functional explanatory
concepts in self-proclaimed mechanists such as Descartes.
A different way of challenging the clarity or exactness of the traditional
distinction emerges when we consider that early modern automata were
 indeed models of Life – that is, not attempts to deny or eliminate the spe -
cificity of Life and its inherent functional properties but rather to model it!
Referring to eighteenth-century automata such as Vaucanson’s duck, I have
noted elsewhere, as has Jessica Riskin, that such constructions were not
 intended so much to ‘demystify’ or ‘reduce’ living entities to a set of neutral,
inert mechanisms, as to assert the irreducibility of both: “The defecating 
Duck and its companions commanded such attention, at such a moment,
 because they dramatized two contradictory claims at once: that living crea-
tures were essentially machines and that living creatures were the antithesis
of machines.”3
And, moving onto early nineteenth-century German biology, Timothy
Lenoir proposed the influential category of ‘teleomechanism’ to explain
 attempts by embryologists like Blumenbach to overcome what Kant had
posited as an insurmountable disjunct, between mechanical and teleological
principles (some of this met with Kant’s approval, leading to a separate
 problem of the extent to which this episode in early nineteenth-century
 biology can be said to be Kantian or not). The general Kantian idea which
Lenoir calls teleomechanism is that, unlike in the rest of natural science where
mechanical explanations must be pursued as far as possible, in the organic
realm, purposive organization has to be assumed as given.4A teleomechanist
research program was explicitly present in early nineteenth-century German
life science in fields such as physiology, systematic zoology and later embry-
ology, with the idea of the Bauplan.
Here I take Lenoir’s term ‘teleomechanism’ more generally as a ‘marker’
for a distinctive conceptual trait in early modern natural philosophy’s
 attempts to respond to the challenge of explaining living, organic entities. 
In previous work I have focused either on the ‘mechanism-friendly’ dimen-
sions of Enlightenment vitalism, or conversely, on the complexity and diver-
sity of ‘mechanism’ faced with the challenge of explaining living beings. I shall
292 Gesnerus 71 (2014)
3 Riskin 2003, 610, 612; on mechanisms and automata as responses to the challenge of explaining
Life see Wolfe 2012a.
4 Lenoir 1982, 30, 113 (he then suggests further subdistinctions, notably, Kant and Blumenbach
versus Kielmeyer, von Baer et al.: the latter group allows for teleological principles to play a
causal role in mechanistic science; Lenoir 1982, 126). The extent to which Kant could actually
have accepted Blumenbach’s vision of teleological principles as real causes of order in organ-
isms – not merely as regulative (or as we might say, heuristic) principles – has been questioned
by Richards 2000 and Zammito 2012, who thus challenge Lenoir’s account (see also Huneman
2006). This does not affect the concept of teleomechanism as I am borrowing it from Lenoir.
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suggest teleomechanism as an indicator of the conceptual space that both lies
between and unifies these two other approaches.
I first present a schematic overview of the early modern naturalphilo -
sophical landscape, as regards mechanistic and teleological models of Life
and their increasing complexification, from Descartes and Harvey, onto
Fontenelle and Leibniz. It is not exhaustive, as I do not try and catalogue what
every major figure said about mechanism (witness the absence of Locke and
Hobbes), nor what every such figure said for or against final causes (witness
the absence of Bacon or Spinoza), but rather focus on the attempts to com-
bine the two in the conceptualising of living beings. Nor do I immediately
propose working definitions of mechanism and teleology prior to the exam-
ination of specific cases, as none would fit all of my examples. In the next
 section I turn to the interplay between vitalist and materialist models of Life
in the 18th century as displaying a well-articulated series of teleomechanist
conceptions, before concluding.
Hybridizing mechanism – or, the hybridity of mechanism
Iatromechanism is generally taken to be a kind of ‘Galileanism of life’: 
an  attempt to quantitatively inscribe physiological phenomena within a
Galilean mechanistic scheme; but in fact, the various, apparently pure state-
ments of iatromechanism mask a more complex (and concrete) reality on 
the ground, where functional dimensions are never wholly absent from
 physiological  explanations – even Descartes will speak of the “office” of 
the liver.5 Teleological language is present in the Discourse on Method itself
(part V):
Then, too, we know from this that the true function (usage) of respiration is to bring enough
fresh air into the lungs to cause the blood entering there from the right-hand cavity of the
heart, where it has been rarefied and almost changed into vapors, to thicken into blood again
before returning to the left-hand cavity.6
Thus it makes sense that even Descartes himself is increasingly seen as having
a more complex physiology than what we would expect from the classic
 opposition between ‘mechanism’ and ‘teleology’. The neat conceptual clarity
of this opposition does not match up with the historical and experimental
context well at all. As Gaukroger has observed, Cartesian mechanistic
 physiology, far from denying the existence of goal-directed processes, is in
fact replete with functional language, e.g. when discussing the circulation of
5 Descartes to Elisabeth, May 1646, AT IV, 407.
6 AT VI, 53; CSM 1985, 138.
blood and the motion of heart; the Cartesian point is not that bodies actually
are machines (an eliminativist view, as Gaukroger puts it) but rather that the
structure and behaviour of bodies are to be explained in the same way that
we explain the structure and behaviour of machines (a reductionist view).7
And this ‘reductionist’ view is compatible with a variety of teleomechanical
hybrids as I describe below. 
Descartes thus also seems less far removed from someone we think of as
more of an ‘iatrochemist’, the neuroanatomist Thomas Willis, who frequently
uses terms like ‘office’, including several times in the Preface to his classic 
De cerebri anatome (1664): “Therefore thenceforward I betook my self
wholly to the study of Anatomy: and as I did chiefly inquire into the offices
and uses of the Brain and its nervous Appendix [i.e. the spinal cord].”8 When
he describes his professorship (“the Province, which I hold in this Academy”),
Willis explains that it required him to discuss “the Offices of the Senses, both
external and also internal, and of the Faculties and Affections of the Soul, as
also of the Organs and various provisions of all these […].”
William Harvey, too, speaks in his discussion of generation of “the uterus
of the hen and its office […],”9 unsurprisingly for someone who explicitly 
uses teleological language, however much Descartes promoted him in the
Discours de la méthode to a key plank in his mechanism (a significant chunk
of part 5 features Harvey, who Descartes refers to as “an English physician”;
Harvey is praised for the discovery of circulation and is described, in the
French version, as “the first to break the ice”, but Descartes disagrees as to
the functioning of the heart, viewing it as a more passive organ which receives
a good deal of its ‘activity’ from the heat of the blood).10 Some scholarship
has focused on who is the more consistent mechanist in this respect, but in
any case Descartes’ mechanistic appropriation of Harvey’s discovery –
 together with the more extended discussion by Dutch physicians – had a 
lasting impact, being repeated as an assessment (and interpretation) in 
the 18th century, e.g. in the article “Méchaniciens (Médecine)” in the
 Encyclopédie, and in a classic paper by T.H. Huxley on the history – and
 fortune – of mechanistic conceptions in biology, in the later 19th century.11
294 Gesnerus 71 (2014)
7  Gaukroger 2000. Osler tends to rely on the older view that if final causes were still present
in Descartes despite his stated intention to ban them from physics, this was a sign of “unex-
punged Scholastic” elements (Osler 2001, 155–156); recent work on the ‘embodied Descartes’
offers a different view. From Descartes onto Boerhaave and later Haller, the interplay
 between mechanistic and teleological notions is more explicit still.
8  Willis 1681, 53f.; Willis 1664, sig. a2r; emphasis mine.
9  Harvey 1651/1981, ex. XIII, 83.
10  Descartes also mentions Harvey in the Passions de l’âme andDescription du corps humain.
11  Huxley 1874.
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Harvey’s analysis of the action of the heart in a wide range of organisms
implied that he could identify a range of structurally dissimilar entities – 
there is no structural similarity between the shrimp’s heart and that of the
chicken – which were recognized as ‘hearts’ principally by their performance
of a common function. But this does not make Harvey some kind of residual
Ancient, however much he says Aristotle is his “leader” (dux)12; his teleology,
whether it is post facto or intrinsic, is also inherently modern. To be sure,
 Harvey is not just a partisan of ‘weak teleology’ in the sense in which some
writers have sought to reconstruct Aristotle as a contemporary functionalist
in the philosophy of mind,13 he is someone who thinks that ‘ends’ matter in a
stronger sense.14 Yet at the same time, final cause in Harvey’s eyes plays only
a weak role in discovery. It may be suggestive to lines of inquiry but only
when, for the most part, it can draw on evidence such as description from
 observation or experiment to suggest or demonstrate the action of a part or
process. In a letter to Caspar Hoffman, an opponent of the idea of circulation,
in May 1636, he wrote:
I merely assert that the movement of the blood from the heart through the arteries into the
whole body, and likewise from the body through the veins back to the heart, is carried 
on continuously and without interruption […]. But […] about the causes of this movement
and circulation, particularly about its final cause, I have never spoken but have omitted it
 altogether, deliberately […] you […] complain that I am a poor Anatomist and a poor
 Analytical Philosopher, because I try to investigate the phenomenon itself without having
established the wherefore […] I add to the phenomenon nothing but the general account of
it, […] no physiological speculation, no cause over and above, nor [do I] speculate for what
reason Nature should give this movement to the blood by means of the beating of the Heart.15
12  In the Preface to De Generatione Animalium Harvey calls Aristotle his general (dux) and
Fabricius his guide (praemonstrator): Harvey 1651/1981, 20.
13  Nussbaum/Putnam 1992.
14  He uses Aristotle’s language of “for the sake of” (in Latin, cuius gratia) rather than “final
cause”. I am grateful for the helpful and interesting discussions on Harvey and teleology I
have had with Peter Distelzweig, Benny Goldberg and James Lennox. I have also benefited
greatly from Distelzweig 2011, Goldberg 2011 and Salter 2010.
15  Harvey, “To Caspar Hoffman”, Appendix One in Whitteridge 1971. Granted, it is not self-
 evident that the centrality of teleology in Harvey should be decided (or not) on the basis of
the role it plays in discovery. Yet, thinking e.g. of Boyle, one would expect a self-conscious
‘teleologist’ in natural philosophy to make active use of the concept as a way of indeed
 producing discoveries in nature (thus Aristotle on teeth growth, or Darwin’s correspondent
Asa Gray on the vertebrate eye). Peter Distelzweig has very carefully analysed Harvey’s
 Prelectiones anatomiae (his Lumleian Lectures) in support of a teleological reading, and
points to the presence of functional vocabulary – usus and actiones – in the very first sentence:
“Anatomia est facultas quae occulari inspectione et sectione partium usus et actiones”
(“Anatomy is the faculty of knowing the actions and uses of the parts by employing visual
inspection and dissection,” Harvey 1964, 4). I agree that this is functional vocabulary, but do
not find that it justifies the reading of Harvey as a teleologist in a stronger sense. However,
my only concern here in this paper is to note the presence of an ‘emergent teleomechanism’
in Harvey, not to come to a stand on the (in my view irresolvable) question of whether Harvey
is a teleologist or not.
The ‘what is it for?’ approach is a legitimate tool of inquiry but so too are
analogy or comparative anatomy, neither of which play any necessary or
 formal role in inquiry for Harvey (although analogical relations between
parts of different animals, such as shrimp and chicken hearts as mentioned
above, are important). François Duchesneau has described Harvey’s method
in De motu cordis as an “analytic teleology”,16 i.e., a post facto reconstruction
of a teleology that is meant to explain the role of each organ – thus a species
of explanatory (rather than metaphysical) teleology. 
We thus need to distinguish between a ‘teleomechanist’ type of complex
description or ‘systems’ description (‘structuro-functional’ explanation in
Wolfe/Terada 2008), and an outright teleological explanation. It does seem
that Harvey rejects, or is cautious with respect to the latter (except in De
 generationewhere he – like many an observer of generation – is more willing
to entertain teleological hypotheses). He lets himself be appropriated in this
direction, which is not the same thing as incorporating such concepts in his
own explanatory scheme; the locus classicusof such appropriation is a famous
comment of Robert Boyle’s: 
When I asked our famous Harvey […] what were the things that induced him to think of a
circulation of the Blood He answered me, that when he took notice that the valves in 
the veins of so many several parts of the body, were so placed that they gave free passage to
the blood towards the heart, but opposed the passage of the venal blood the contrary way:
he was invited to imagine, that so provident a cause as nature had not plac’d so many valves
without design.17
Notice that Boyle is not just trumpeting design and summoning Harvey in
service of this project; he is emphasizing that the notion of design actively
helped Harvey in his experimental work. While my intention is not to simply
call for a reevaluation of the importance of teleology in early modern
science,18 just as I did not want to centrally focus on the reevaluation of 
the complexities of mechanism, it seems unavoidable to call attention to 
its central presence in Boyle – undoubtedly the best-known teleologist in
early modern science; he would have preferred to be called a friend of final
causes – and his peers.
Boyle stresses the ‘utility’ of final causes in natural-philosophical expla -
nations (it is possible for someone to say all of this beautiful handiwork –
 vertebrate eyes, finches’ beaks, lungs and teeth and so on – is the sign of a
Designer) while also noting that all scientific explanations must rely on effi-
cient causes. Thus in the Christian Virtuoso, he acknowledges that, “To be 
16  Duchesneau 1998, conclusion.
17  Boyle 1772/1968, V, 427; see discussion in Bylebyl 1982.
18  See Osler 2001, Lennox 1983 for a historical corrective and Fuchs 2001, Sloan 2007 for more
normative statements of the importance of teleology.
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told that an eye is the organ of sight, and that this is performed by that faculty
of the mind which from its function is called visive, will give a man but a sorry
account of the instruments and manner of vision itself, or of the knowledge
of that Optificer, who, as the Scripture speaks, ‘formed the eye’”.19And in the
Disquisition: “the naturalist should not suffer the search, or the discovery of
a Final Cause of Nature’s works, to make him under-value or neglect the
 studious indagation [investigation] of their efficient causes.”20 But there is no
deliberate hybridization of two models here; rather, there is the insistence
that mechanism and design go well together, which is not teleomechanism.
Harvey’s caution compared to Boyle’s appropriation of him does not make
him, mutatis mutandis, a perfect specimen of teleomechanism as something
‘emergent’ here; but it means we need to be discerning when attributing
 ‘teleological’ views to these figures. As Alan Salter has noted, forty years after
the publication of De Motu Cordis, when the physician Richard Lower, a
 onetime Oxford colleague of Harvey’s, sought to extend the Harveyan
 project on circulation, Lower made very much this sort of distinction. For
 instance, in Chapter 1 of his Tractatus de Corde, we read that 
I must preface my account of [the movement of the blood] by some remarks on the Position
and Structure of the heart. When these have been duly considered and collated, it will be
 easier to grasp how carefully both its Fabric and Position are adapted for movement, and how
fittingly everything is arranged for the distribution of the blood to the organs of the body as
a whole.22
The two steps Lower recommends – ascertain position and structure, then
‘grasp’ fabric, position, and ‘fittingness’ – match up with the distinction I
 suggested above, between a teleomechanistic explanation understood as
 employing a weaker, explanatory teleology and an outright teleological
 explanation in the stronger, ontological sense (e.g. design in Boyle and
 ‘fittingness’ in Lower).
Harvey seems both to employ the former kind – explanatory, analytic or
heuristic – of teleological explanation, while, e.g. Lower stands for something
closer to Galenic, ‘actual’ or ‘directed’ teleology.22 Yet Harvey often tries to
be agnostic here, and does not seem overly keen to be viewed as a ‘modern’
protagonist of the New Science: rather than proclaiming his ‘modernity’ like
19  Boyle 1772/1965, V, 516.
20  Boyle 1772/1965, V, 411.
21  Lower 1669/1932, 2. Thanks to Alan Salter for this.
22  Von Staden suggests that Galen subscribes to a “genuine” teleology, not a “merely heuristic
teleology” (von Staden 1997, 197); Galen often emphasizes that his predecessors failed to 
see that any explanation of the function of the parts must be thoroughly teleological. Follow-
ing Hankinson 1989, one can say that Galen – like Plato and unlike Aristotle – follows a
 “directed” or “intentional” teleology.
Hobbes, Bacon or Descartes, he calls the neoterics “shitbreeches”.23This syn-
cretistic character of Harvey’s position and the way it can be appropriated
more teleologically (Boyle, Lower), mechanistically (Descartes) or in other
ways, is itself an indicator of what I term the hybridity of teleomechanism: a
synthetic capacity, which produces an entirely immanent explanatory model,
without levels or ontological differentiations.
Indeed, even Boyle, if viewed more in the light of the mechanics of the body
and less of design or rational teleology, belongs to a diverse sub-set of thinkers
including Claude Perrault, Gassendi, Fontenelle and Leibniz, who seek to
 articulate a model of the human body that combines the best insights of the
mechanical theories but also chemical theories.24 Boyle refers to the human
body as a “compound engine, such as mechanicians would call  hydraulic-
pneumatical” and elaborates on this by pointing to the “spirits, vital and
 animal”, the “little springy particles” and “things analogous to local  ferments”,
all of which “are not to be discerned in a dead body”.25 But we  encounter a
first full-blown form of teleomechanism with Fontenelle and Leibniz.
Earlier I recalled how mechanism – Cartesian and other – is more complex
than the straw man of iatromechanism. This is the case both in its ‘canonical
forms’ (from Descartes to Boyle to Boerhaave) and, less surprisingly, in its
later more complex forms such as Haller’s physiology. Similarly – in a kind
of parallel – iatrochemical explanations such as those found in Willis and
Stahl blend, if not seamlessly, quantitative and qualitative definitions of
 fermentation, such that one no longer knows what is a strictly particulate
 explanation versus one on which invokes ‘liquors’, ‘juices’, ‘heat’ and so forth.
Teleomechanism proper appears when all these models are deliberately com-
bined. Consider for instance this elegant statement on the body from Bernard
de Fontenelle in 1707, ostensibly in the context of a discussion of the pituitary
gland:
The human body considered in relation to an infinite number of voluntary movements it can
perform, is a prodigious assemblage of Levers pulled by Ropes. If one considers it in relation
to the motion of the liquors it contains, it is another [sort of] assemblage of an infinite number
of Tubes and Hydraulic Machines. Finally, if one examines it in relation to the production 
of these liquors, it is an infinite assemblage of Chymical Instruments or Vessels, Filters,
 Distillation Vats, Receptacles, Serpentines, etc. […] The greatest Chemistry apparatus of all
in the human Body, the most wonderful Laboratory is in the Brain, from whence this Extract
of the blood is drawn known as Spirits, the sole material motors of the entire Machine of the
Body.26
23  “He [Harvey] bid me to goe to the Fountain-head, and read Aristotle, Cicero, Avicenna, and
did call the Neoteriques shitt-breeches” (John Aubrey, Brief Lives, cited in French 1994, 220).
24  Azouvi 1982.
25  Boyle 1772/1965, V, 422; Lennox 1983, 52.
26  Fontenelle 1707/1730, 16, my translation. 
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If we take teleomechanism in this more specific sense, not just of the presence
of disparate elements – mechanistic and purposive, or iatromechanical and
iatrochemical – in a given text, but to mean a deliberate grafting together 
of these elements with a synthetic intent, an even more overt case would be
Leibniz. Where Boyle had defined the body as a hydraulico-pneumatic
 machine (comparable as it were to Fontenelle’s hydraulico-chemical ma-
chine), Leibniz goes one step further, presenting the body as a hydraulico-
pneumatico-pyrotechnic machine.27 In order to explain the functions of the
body, Leibniz appeals to an idea of final causation, which he claims, is essential
to the description of any machine: 
The human body, like the body of any animal, is a sort of machine. Any machine moreover
is best defined in terms of its final cause, so that in the description of the parts it is therefore
apparent in what way each of them is coordinated with the others for the intended use.28
Thus, like Boyle and unlike the received view of Descartes, Leibniz embraces
teleological explanations of the functions of the extended body of animals
and humans, due to his overall pessimism regarding the possibility of fully
 explaining bodily functions mechanistically: “The organism of animals is a
mechanism which supposes a divine preformation. What follows upon it is
purely natural and entirely mechanical.”29 In both Boyle and Leibniz, the
 teleology at work is more metaphysically foundationalist than, notably, in
Harvey or Fontenelle. But in all these cases we have seen a rough hybridity
at work, manifest in diverse articulations of the mechanical and the chemical,
the mechanical and the functional, and of course a myriad sorts of teleology,
all of which are compatible with or supervene upon mechanistic explanations.
But the fullest teleomechanist synthesis of these trends, in a more ‘immanent’
vein, appears in the interplay between materialism and vitalism in the eigh-
teenth century (particularly in the latter).
Vitalism as expanded mechanism
The term ‘vitalism’ is still frequently used, in both the history of the life
 sciences and contemporary philosophy of biology to indicate something
which lies outside the boundaries of respectable science, and also as a  
quasi-synonym of ‘teleology’ understood as a metaphysically foundationalist
invocation of final causes. Conversely, materialism is frequently defined as a
27  Fichant 2003, Smith 2007.
28  Leibniz, Corpus hominis et uniuscujusque animalis Machina est quaedam, 1680–1683, trans.
J. Smith, in Smith 2007, 151.
29  Leibniz, Fifth Letter to Clarke, § 115, in Clarke 1738/1978, vol. 4, 667.
direct opposite of vitalism; it is treated as a quasi-synonym of ‘mechanism’
(despite Descartes or Boyle’s anti-materialism, and Diderot’s anti-mecha-
nism, to name some obvious cases). This is still the case in a recent entry in a
major reference source, in which we are told that “materialists explain every-
thing in terms of matter and motion; vitalists, in terms of the soul or vital
force”.30 The various ways, historical and conceptual, medico-biological and
metaphysical, in which this is a false opposition, make for an interesting story
but not one that belongs here. Rather, I wish to show how both materialism
and vitalism, considered now in some representative 18th-century cases, are
moments of teleomechanism. I shall discuss each of these in turn.
18th-century materialism has frequently been presented as ‘mechanistic’.
In fact, eclecticism (or what I have called hybridity) is the norm here, and 
for our purposes it is noteworthy that materialists such as Julien Offray de
La Mettrie (despite the set of associations that are conjured up by his most
famous title, L’Homme-Machine) also have a highly ‘embodied’, not strictly
mechanistic conception of the body-machine.31 La Mettrie’s medical materi-
alism combines mechanistic language – indeed, the most classic mechanist
metaphor, clockwork – with properties (chemical, organizational, etc.) that
machines do not possess: 
The body is but a clock, whose clockmaker is the new chyle. Nature’s first care, when the chyle
enters the blood, is to excite in it a kind of fever which the chemists, who dream only of
 furnaces, had to construe as fermentation. This fever produces a greater filtration of the
 spirits, which mechanically animate the muscles and the heart, as if they had been sent there
by order of the will.32
Indeed, for La Mettrie “Man is so complex a machine (une Machine si com-
posée) that it is impossible to get a clear idea of the machine beforehand, and
hence impossible to define it”.33The machine here becomes an entity with an
internal principle of organization, which empirically is a ‘mechanico-chemi-
cal’ hybrid, and conceptually is more ‘structural-functional’ than the classic,
restrictive picture of mechanism (and as we saw, even in Descartes the reality
is less restrictive than the reputation).
Diderot sometimes uses machine metaphors in writing about the body, 
but much more rarely than La Mettrie, and in that sense he is less of a teleo-
mechanist, understood as someone for whom the explanation of the living
body requires an integration of mechanical and teleological models. Whereas
La Mettrie is indeed interested in the organic, living body as a ‘basement
level’, something ontologically irreducible (not in the sense that he does not
30  Wellmann 2003.
31  Wolfe 2012b.
32  La Mettrie 1987, I, 105; see Pépin 2011.
33  La Mettrie 1987, I, 66–67.
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accept reductionist, componential explanation but in the sense he is not a
genuine, restrictive mechanist); but he is interested in exploring the boundary
levels in between body and machine, or machine and organism. As François
Pépin has put it: “La Mettrie aime jouer avec les plus et les moins de la ma-
chine.”34 Diderot, in contrast, is fascinated with more complex machine
metaphors for organism such as the loom and the vibrating chords of a harp-
sichord, to which he adds a variety of chimiatric concepts,35 stressing for
 instance that “the human body is a system of actions and reactions”.36 And
he is both influenced by and in interaction with the conceptual production of
vitalist medicine.37 What do we find if we turn to vitalism?
The word ‘vitalism’ may have been first used to describe the doctrines 
of the Montpellier medical faculty in the 18th century.38 The Montpellier
 vitalists overtly try and position their ‘doctrine’ as a ‘neither-nor’ in between
the two strongly opposite positions of mechanism and animism. Bordeu,
Ménuret, Fouquet, Barthez in different ways and with different emphases,
criticize mechanism – whether Italian iatromechanism, Descartes, Boerhaave
or even Haller (who is of course already something of a hybrid figure in terms
of ‘strict mechanism’) for its lack of attention, or explanatory weakness faced
with the ‘fact’ of living, embodied agents, which require specific types of
 explanations. But symmetrically, they criticize the animism of G.E. Stahl for
its lack of explanatory power, period, since it is a form of ‘supernaturalism’,
in which “the life of the soul consists […] particularly in action exercised and
carried out in a body, by means of a body, on and affecting bodily activities”.39
(This is not true of their mentor Sauvages.)
Using perfectly teleomechanical language, Barthez says that “mechanics”
is useful for determining exactly what “the advantages of the living body’s
organs are, in the mechanism of its intended functions”.40 Bordeu refers to
the ‘evident fact’ that animal bodies are not like watches because they are
self-winding, and comments that unfortunately the Stahlians took this to
mean that the higher-level features of vitality (fighting off illness and main-
taining stability in the body, whether its temperature, digestive system, etc.)
are dependent on the soul.41 Ménuret appeals in reductionist fashion to a
fairly basic, indeed ‘base’ level of bodily dysfunction – inflammation of the
34  Pépin 2011, 266.
35  Cheung 2010.
36  Diderot 1975–, XVII, 337.
37  Kaitaro 1997.
38  Wolfe/Terada 2008.
39  Stahl 1859, § LII, 298.
40  Barthez 1858, 37.
41  Bordeu 1751, § CXXXI, 1818, vol. 1, 204.
lower intestine – in order to challenge animism, and suggests that we would
“laugh at an animist or Stahlian who would argue that this illness is a gift of
Nature or the soul”.42
The relevant concept here, as I have discussed elsewhere, is the ‘animal
economy’, which is fully articulated teleomechanism, as it is both organismic
(as in the key metaphor of the beeswarm43) and also subserved by a variety
of mechanistic explanations. The vitalist Louis de La Caze describes his 
aim as the explanation of “the mechanism which subserves the functions of
the animal economy”, a mechanistic level “chiefly founded on anatomical
 observations”.44 Ménuret speaks in rather hybrid terms of “l’organisation
 animée de notre machine”.45 Similarly, Buffon, the theorist of “organic
 molecules”, comfortably speaks in the same sentence of “animal economy”
and “machine”, or “la mécanique vivante” and “le mécanisme de l’économie
 animale”,46 conversely, ‘machine’ was frequently used to mean ‘body’. 
Examples of medical areas requiring these hybrid, teleomechanist analy-
ses include sphygmology (the medicine of the pulse) and, as a particular
 organ, the glands. Bordeu is often described as having selected the glands as
his theoretical object because they are the exemplar of what is non-mecha-
nistic about the animal economy, since all mechanistic physiologies stumble,
not on the humours the glands extract from the blood, but on the workings
of the secretory organs themselves: for instance, how does a gland differen-
tiate between one fluid and another, given that they are clearly ‘intended’ to
deal with specific fluids and not others? Humours, Bordeu says, cannot be ex-
plained according to “the actions of solids and the disposition of the organs”.47
But at the same time he doesn’t want to fall back on a chimiatric explanation
of humours, just to emphasize that pure mechanism can’t account for them.
The distinctively Bordevian emphasis here is on the ‘sensitivity’ of each gland
(which works like a force). Now, to achieve this level of analysis the glands
have to be studied according to “position and interconnections, in order to
know their action” (46): there is the structuro-functional analysis encapsu-
lated in a sentence; but it is not superfluous to note that Bordeu continues,
“this is indeed part of Anatomy” (emphasis in original). Simply, the scope 
of “anatomical inquiry” must be widened, Bordeu argues, to include “the use
of the parts, their interplay, connections and relations”. This is what he means
42  “Ténesme”, Enc. XVI, 137a.
43  Wolfe/Terada 2008, Wolfe 2009.
44  La Caze 1755, 2.
45  Enc. XIII, 239.
46  Buffon 1753, 3–4; article “Histoire naturelle”, Enc. VIII, 226b.
47  Bordeu 1751, Preface, in Bordeu 1818, vol. 1, 48.
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by “animating the skeleton of anatomy”.48 Indeed, Bordeu, here as elsewhere,
is less ‘anti-mechanistic’ than he is an ‘expanded mechanist’, performing
 experiments by compressing a piece of sponge in the jaws to study how a
gland reacts to compression by muscular tissue.
Unlike the Oxford physiologists, for Bordeu it is not the structure and
 position of organs which has to be ascertained so that a higher teleology can
be ascertained – a higher level of intelligibility and/or a Design as in Boyle.
Rather, there is an immanent level of “position […] interconnections […] 
use of the parts […] their interplay, connections and relations”49: teleo -
mechanism.
Conclusion
I have sought to reconstruct a concept of teleomechanism in early modern
and Enlightenment natural philosophy (with a particular emphasis on med-
ical theory and physiology), which minimally shows the following: 
First, that mechanism and antimechanism, while they may possess an
 enviable intellectual clarity as conceptual constellations, are in fact impos -
sible to separate or historically define in isolation from one another.
 Sup posedly pure mechanistic models exhibit sensitivity to functional
 properties (from Descartes and Boerhaave straight down to Haller’s ‘micro-
mechanism’); supposedly antimechanistic models such as the positions here
referred to as ‘vitalist’ exhibit a greater recognition of the role, pertinence
and validity of mechanical explanations of particular phenomena than is
 generally believed.
Second, that the forms of teleology we encounter in the above analyses are
‘explanatory’ rather than ‘ontological’ – attempts to respond to the challenge
of explaining living bodies rather than assertions of an inherent and over -
arching finalistic structure of the world; thus even prior to the organismic 
or organizational models of living being presented under names such as the
‘animal economy’, these earlier teleologies are already reasonably close to a
Lenoirian kind of teleomechanism.
Thirdly (hence), teleomechanism here is neither a claim of total onto -
logical closure as is sometimes associated with mechanism (compare
Gabbey’s comment that 17th-century mechanism “tried to explain everything,
48  Bordeu 1751, Preface, in Bordeu 1818, vol. 1, 46 – a formulation curiously recalling Haller’s
description of physiology as “animated anatomy” (“Physiologia est animata anatome”, Haller
1747, 5). 
49  Bordeu 1751, Preface, in Bordeu 1818, vol. 1, 46.
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which was too much by a long chalk”50) nor a claim of regional ontological
uniqueness where organisms have teleological features which differentiate
them from mechanical nature overall.51 Instead, teleomechanism combines
the model-making, reductionist component of mechanism and the pluralism
(in the sense of the recognition of hierarchical plateaus of organization) 
of teleology. As we saw with the animal economy and its representative 
image, the bee-swarm, these analyses seek to articulate an idea of  complex
organization that integrates mechanical explanations. However – depending
on how strong a teleology it incorporates – it can hold that  mechanical
 explanations have limits, and thereby allow that “within the  organic realm
the various empirical regularities associated with functional organisms can
be investigated”.52
In that sense, fourth, teleomechanism is quite contrary to the traditional
distinction between mechanistic and organismic accounts of living beings, 
in which the former are usually presented as excluding crucial features of
 living organisms in order to achieve a complete model; as e.g. in the opposi-
tion between the reality of homeostatic processes and the ‘mere’ account 
of anatomical structures.53 Teleomechanism does not oppose the dynamism
of homeostatic processes to the static character of anatomy: it seeks to unite
them.
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